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FOREWORD
Since 1991 the international community has imposed and
sustained an impressive constellation of measures to bottle up
the Iraqi regime--an oil embargo, other economic sanctions,
intrusive inspections, two "no-fly" zones, and the Kurdish "safehaven" in northern Iraq. For its part, Iraq has opted to "tough
it out" rather than fulfill the cease-fire conditions that ended
the Gulf War. The stalemate has devolved into a test of wills,
with Saddam Hussein betting that the discipline of his Ba'th
Party cadres will outlast the unity of the coalition arrayed
against him.
For 5 years U.S. policy has managed to steer a coalition of
states which share broad interests in regional stability and free
trade. Yet below these common interests, the United States has
walked a tightrope stretched between competing objectives vis-avis Iraq, e.g., undermining Saddam while preserving Iraq as a
counterweight to Iran; protecting the Kurds while not promoting
their independence. Time, however, has a habit of eroding
international coalitions and exposing seams in the details of
policy. Iraq's September 1996 actions in the Kurdish north found
such a seam in coalition objectives, or, to return to the
original metaphor, shook one anchor of the U.S. policy tightrope.
This study by Dr. Stephen Pelletiere examines how the
Kurdish crisis developed, why--most disturbingly--the key
coalition members divided in response to U.S. actions, and what
factors might guide future U.S. policy. He concludes that U.S.
policy needs reanchoring if we are to achieve our paramount
interests in this vital region.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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MANAGING STRAINS IN THE COALITION:
WHAT TO DO ABOUT SADDAM?
America's Role.
Since before World War I, the West has been interested in
the Persian Gulf. Originally, Great Britain dominated the region.
The British regarded the area as part of their sphere of
interest. London particularly feared the penetration of some
foreign power into the Gulf, from which it would threaten India,
the crown jewel of Britain's empire.
In the 19th century, Britain's fears had focused on Russia.
But this soon shifted to fear of Germany, as the empire of Kaiser
Wilhelm built the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway, to terminate in the
northern Gulf. To neutralize the German advance, Britain
cultivated the petty sheikhs who lived along the Gulf littoral.1
It offered them subsidies if they, in turn, would agree not to
alienate any of their territory to a foreign power. In this way,
the British hoped to prevent the Germans from setting up a base
and bringing troops into the region.
Then, in the early 1900s, oil was discovered in Iran, and
Britain moved quickly to sew up concessions.2 For a time, Great
Britain seemed to be the predominant power in the area, until
American oil companies began to operate there.3 At that, Britain
was forced to share its influence with Washington. Nonetheless,
until the late 1960s Britain was the major power in this part of
the world. Washington acted as a silent partner, backing up the
British, but generally letting London take the lead in directing
affairs.
This condominium arrangement persisted until 1969, when the
British announced that they could no longer guard the Gulf. Their
economy was too weakened from having suffered through two World
Wars. Thus it was that the United States took over, effectively
becoming the Gulf's policeman. Western influence over the Gulf-and, by extension, over the international oil industry--was
challenged immediately after Britain departed the Middle East.
This occurred with the outbreak of the Third Arab-Israeli War,
and the tremendous increase in oil prices that accompanied that
conflict.
The Arab Oil Embargo took power away from the oil-consuming
countries--mainly Great Britain and the United States--and
transferred it to the oil producing states, mainly the Arab oil
producers (and Iran), all of which were affiliated with the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Initially,
under OPEC's direction, oil prices pursued a trajectory steadily
upward. They went from less than $3 a barrel to more than $24 a
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barrel immediately after the 1973 War, and they rose again with
the overthrow of the Iranian Shah in 1979. Then the market
steadied once more, largely due to intervention by the United
States.
The United States worked out a special relationship with
Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who have the greatest reserves of oil
in the world, agreed to cooperate with the West to ensure that
prices would be kept within reasonable limits (reasonable, that
is, by Western standards).4 The Saudis would endeavor to keep
prices low and that would keep inflation down, a boon to the
industrialized states. At the same time they would strive to
maintain prices at a high enough level so that the oil producers
could benefit.5
In return for cooperation with the West's financial markets,
the Saudis got protection. Originally, this was against alleged
menaces from the Soviet Union. But even before the fall of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the nature of the
protection had changed.
In the late 1970s, with the rise of Khomeini in Iran, the
lower Gulf trembled before the specter of militant Islam. Then
the Iraqis went to war with Tehran, and that seemed to check
Iran's growing power. However, Iraq's assault on Iran soon
faltered, and Arab and Western aid were required to sustain
Baghdad in a lengthy stalemate. Before the Iran-Iraq War had
ended, the United States was covertly assisting the Iraqis to
turn back the Iranian tide.
When Iraq defeated Iran, a new danger to stability in the
Gulf occurred, as in 1990 Iraqi forces overran neighboring
Kuwait. The United States then assembled one of the great
coalitions of all time, which ousted the Iraqi army from Kuwait,
and imposed military and economic sanctions on Baghdad which
continue to this day.
Why was the United States able to form such a powerful union
of states against Saddam Hussein? Because, in the eyes of most
the world's countries--and this was particularly true of the
industrialized nations--what the United States was doing was
necessary to fulfill its role as guardian of the Gulf. By
restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait, Washington sustained the
operation of the international oil trade, on which Western
economies depended.6
However, in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, revolt
erupted in the Iraqi Kurdish regions. When the Iraqi army moved
to suppress this uprising, thousands of Kurds fled to the
mountains of neighboring Turkey, precipitating a humanitarian
crisis. Washington mounted Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which
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subsequently was expanded to provide a safehaven for the Kurds.
At this point, formerly firm allies of the United States began
draw apart from it, distancing themselves from the U.S. effort to
help the Kurdish minority.
The former Soviet Union, for example, evidenced deep concern
over the U.S.-sponsored operation. Like Baghdad, Moscow is
bedeviled by fractious minorities, seeking to break free and form
their own states. Thus, the Russians were not in favor of
restricting a government's right to exercise authority within its
own borders.7
France, too, was not altogether pleased with Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT. On the one hand, the French strongly supported
the Kurds.8 But, during the Iran-Iraq War, Paris had been
Baghdad's primary weapons supplier. After the war, it expected to
be rewarded for this aid with oil concessions. To the extent that
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT prevented Iraq from rehabilitating
itself, it hurt French chances of obtaining economic rewards from
the Iraqis.
Turkey, too, was against Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. It
viewed the Kurds as a dangerous element. The Kurds are smugglers,
an occupation they have pursued for centuries. Once the safehaven
was set up, the Turks expected the Kurds to take advantage of it
to carry on--and expand--their illicit activities.9
Further, the Turks have a large Kurdish population of their
own, which, they feared, would fall in with the lawless element
in Iraq.10 The anarchy there would spread across the border into
Turkey, with nothing to stop the movement since Iraq's security
forces could not operate above the 36th parallel, a constraint
imposed by the Allies on Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan would become a
smugglers' paradise, the Turks felt.
Finally, many of the Arab states doubted the wisdom of
separating the north of Iraq from Baghdad's control. This would
weaken the regime, and dangerously skew the power balance in the
area toward Iran--something that no Arab government wished to
see.11
All of this is to say that the establishment of the
safehaven in northern Iraq did not enjoy the kind of support that
Operation DESERT STORM had engendered. It was not widely reported
in the West, but in many quarters the United States' newfound
policy of protecting the Kurds had few regional adherents.
Moving Toward Rupture.
In 1991 an incident occurred which buttressed the coalition
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partners' misgivings about Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The safe
haven had just been established under the direction of the two
principal Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.
Barzani was the spokesman for the northern Kurds, roughly all of
those around Zakho and Dohuk, and Talabani, the southern Kurds
from around Sulaimaniyah.12 (See Figure 1.)
In May 1991 Saddam Hussein made an offer of autonomy to the
Kurdish leaders.13 This was a renewal of a proposal the Iraqi
government had tendered to the Kurds in 1970.14 It was, in many
ways, an attractive plan. Indeed, the leader of the Kurdish
community in 1970, Mulla Mustafa Barzani (the father of Masoud),
nearly accepted the offer, but ultimately he rejected it,
choosing instead to return to war against Baghdad.15 Now, in 1991,
Masoud Barzani was tempted to enter into a compact with Saddam,
but his colleague, Talabani, balked at this. Ultimately Barzani
came around to Talabani's way of thinking. During the
negotiations with Baghdad, Washington and London behaved as if
they disapproved of the talks, and afterwards both appeared
relieved the deal was not consummated.16
Why did the United States and Britain--the principals
supporting Operation PROVIDE COMFORT--object to the Kurds' coming
to terms with Iraq? Was not the aim of the United Nations (U.N.)
resolution, under which the safe haven had been created, to
develop a modus vivendi between the Kurds and the central
government? If the United States did not want to see the parties
reconciled, what was the point of the exercise in the north?
Turkey feared that Washington policymakers had a secret
agenda; that undercover they were working towards the formation
of an independent Kurdish state.17 The Turks were appalled by this
prospect, since, as far as they were concerned, any such
development would be unworkable. That Washington could not
appreciate this fact was profoundly troubling to the Turks.
Ankara sought and got assurances from the United States
that it would uphold the sovereignty of Iraq, and not permit the
Kurds to break away from the control of Baghdad.18 But that was
all it got. It could not, for example, discover where events in
the north were headed; and in particular, how long the safehaven
was likely to be kept in place.
Meanwhile, U.N. relief organizations had begun to enter the
north of Iraq, bringing much needed supplies.19 The two major
Kurdish factions--the Barzanis and Talabanis--began to organize
life in the north, and then in 1992 the Kurds elected a
Parliament.20 This development rekindled fear in Ankara of a move
toward statehood. The United States reassured the Turks that it
viewed Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as purely a humanitarian effort,
with no political overtones beyond precluding Iraqi military
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predations in the north.
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Aid for the Kurds came primarily from the United States, the
United Nations, and from some nongovernmental organizations.
There was not a lot of money available, but enough to support
Barzani and Talabani, and to pay their retainers, including the
so-called pesh mergas (selfless ones), who make up the leaders'
personal bodyguard.21 As for the rest of the Kurds, they had to
make do as best they could. This produced widespread
dissatisfaction, as the mass of Kurds had expected the Americansponsored operation to bring them some employment.
The Kurds had expected to see an extensive bureaucracy
develop in the north, to run the area. But, as long as Washington
ruled out a separate state for the Kurds, this was impossible.
The smuggler Kurds, those lawless elements, could survive without
a government; however, the city Kurds, who had no independent
means of support, suffered.22 For them, one of the few options
they had was to become pesh mergas, serving either Barzani or
Talabani.
It was perhaps the proliferation of retainers, who had to be
provided for, that led to a breakdown of Kurdish society. As the
demands upon the Kurdish leaders grew, they cast about for
additional sources of income. Barzani, for example, began
collecting a tax from Turkish truck drivers hauling contraband
across the northern Iraqi-Turkish border.23 This "customs"
operation was quite lucrative, and netted Barzani upwards of
$250,000 a day. When Barzani refused to share this revenue with
Talabani, the latter seized the Kurdish capital of Irbil, and
along with it the "state" treasury.24 With that, Kurdish society
exploded into civil war.
To try to compose this dissension, the United States called
a number of conferences among the Kurds, but none were
successful. The scenario always was the same--the Kurdish chiefs
would agree to mend their differences, but then would return to
their home bases and promptly resume their warfare. U.S.
policymakers seemed not to appreciate what was at the root of the
difficulty, namely that without some formal declaration of
status, Kurdish society was in limbo. The Kurdish leadership
could not raise funds from the international lending community;
it could not go to Baghdad for assistance, and the U.S. Congress
was unable-- or unwilling--to appropriate sufficient aid. There
needed to be a resolution of the situation, something that would
end the drift that was destroying Kurdish morale.
Meanwhile, conditions in the north continued to deteriorate.
The relief agencies began to pull out of the region, being unable
to guarantee the safety of their staffs. The Kurds wanted jobs
and expected the relief agencies to fire regular employees in
order to take them on the payroll. Some relief workers were
seized and held as hostages until ransoms were paid.25
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Effectively, the Kurdish region was doubly oppressed because,
once the relief workers cut down their operations, available
assistance was inadequate. In Baghdad's view, the Kurds' action
in separating from the central government absolved it of any
obligation towards them.
It was probably inevitable that resentment towards the
United States would increase. To many Kurds, it was inexplicable
that Washington did not step in to at least end the civil war.
Bitter accusations against Washington and London, the upholders
of the safehaven, began to be expressed.26 I believe that the U.S.
failure to act was due to an incorrect assessment of conditions
inside Iraq. U.S. policymakers apparently believed that Saddam
could not last much longer. His people were suffering under the
most draconian sanctions imposed upon a nation since World War I.
His army was short of equipment. There had been one significant
defection from the ruling clique, and at least one serious tribal
disturbance.27
Therefore, despite appeals to act, Washington stood its
ground, believing that the trouble would soon be over. U.S.
policymakers had convinced themselves that Saddam's days were
numbered, and that, once he fell, a new pro-Western regime would
set things to rights. The problem with this strategy was that it
underestimated the Iraqi Ba'th Party.
The faction that represents Ba'thism in Iraq is the best
organized and disciplined party among the Arabs, if not in the
entire Middle East.28 Having sustained itself in power since 1968,
and survived what seemed at one time to be a ruinous war with
Iran, the party is used to handling crises. As this one deepened,
the Ba'thists tightened their control. The Iraqi people,
experiencing the pressure, went along with the party's dictates.
States in the area, who knew the Ba'th, did not find this
discipline surprising. But, in Washington the attitude of
watchful waiting persisted, as the conviction remained that
Saddam's days were surely numbered.29 In the meantime, a new, and
unexpected development--inside Turkey-- complicated the picture.
The Mystery of the PKK.
One of the abiding mysteries of Kurdish society involves the
activities of a group called the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).This
is made up of Turkish-Kurds who oppose the Ankara government. The
PKK advertises itself as a separatist organization, meaning that
it would like to detach the southeastern Kurdish region from the
rest of Turkey. At the same time, however, the PKK leaders are
vague as to what sort of society would be set up once the
separation was complete.30 The PKK was, at one time, a self-
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proclaimed Marxist outfit.
What is puzzling about the PKK is the numbers of Kurds who
supposedly are adherents to its cause. Starting in 1991, after
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT came into existence, the media--here
and in Europe--began citing membership figures in the thousands.
This, despite the fact that--as late as 1988--the party could not
have claimed two hundred members, in toto. Indeed, among Kurdish
militant groups the PKK is a late bloomer, so to speak. It did
not become a group of consequence until 1984.31
I believe the PKK's phenomenal growth was not due to
ideological conversion on the part of a mass of Turkish Kurds,
but rather to something else. After the Kurdish rebellion in
northern Iraq--which accompanied the wind-down of Operation
DESERT STORM and the announcement by the United States that it
would mount Operation PROVIDE COMFORT--Syria and Iran became
alarmed over what they perceived to be NATO penetration of the
region.
Syria and Iran have always suspected the link between Turkey
and the United States through NATO.32 They view any move by
Washington and Ankara in the northern Gulf as a NATO-inspired
intrigue, and they try to resist such moves, however they can. In
particular, Damascus and Tehran condemned Turkey's agreement to
allow the allies to use Incirlik Air Base in southeastern Turkey
as a staging area for flights over northern Iraq.33 The Iranians,
in particular, were fearful that the Allies would fly
surveillance missions from there over Iranian territory.
I believe that Tehran and Damascus exploited what then was
an insignificant organization, the PKK, to counter Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT.34 The Syrians and Iranians distributed money
inside the safe haven, and this bought them mercenaries, or
rather pesh mergas. These individuals undertook operations
against the Turks. Shortly after Operation PROVIDE COMFORT
commenced, the PKK (or, at least, individuals claiming to be
adherents of the PKK) began attacking Turkish troop installations
in southeastern Turkey from bases the organization had set up
just over the border in Iraq.35
There was great deal of publicity over these attacks, and,
unfortunately for the Turks, this was instrumental in holding up
Ankara's bid to join the European Economic Community.36
Investigatory missions were dispatched from Brussels to examine
conditions among the Turkish Kurdish minority in southeastern
Anatolia. This seems to have provoked demonstrations on the part
of Kurdish militants, who sought to embarrass the Turkish
government.37
Turkey reacted in two ways. First, it cracked down hard on
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the militants, and this, of course, created a renewed storm of
disapproval in Europe.38 But it also cited the existence of the
PKK, and the unrest that it was provoking in the southeast, as
proof that the safehaven was a destabilizing element in the
region.
This drew a declaration from Washington that it regarded the
PKK as a terrorist group, and that the United States sympathized
with Turkey's need to suppress the organization. Meanwhile,
Turkish commandos had begun conducting cross-border raids into
Iraq, to root out the PKK cadres.39 At least this was the
announced intent. In fact, I believe that Turkey used the PKK as
a pretext to intervene in the north, which under international
law it was prevented from doing.
I do not believe Turkey--despite its protestations about the
PKK--was seriously threatened by the organization, at least not
in 1992. But the Turks were convinced that the situation in
northern Iraq was fraught with peril, and that, unless checked,
it would soon get out of control. Specifically, the Turks feared
that the Iraqi Kurdish region was developing into a power vacuum,
since there was no authority capable of imposing order there.
Hence, the cross-border raids were a means the Turks
employed to impose their authority over the region. The tactic of
the raids was ingenious, because it enabled the Turks to satisfy
both the United States and themselves. They were able to go on
cooperating with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which the United
States wanted, and yet they could simultaneously intervene in the
safehaven to curb the Kurds whenever they saw fit. It is also
likely that the Turks cleared the raids with the Iraqis in
advance. Iraq and Turkey had cooperated on a similar scheme
during the Iran-Iraq War.40 In the mid-1980s, the Iranians had
tried to create a second front against Iraq, using the Barzani
and Talabani Kurds. Ankara and Baghdad worked out an agreement
whereby Turkey was empowered to cross over into the Iraqi Kurdish
region to suppress the pro-Iranian guerrillas. This arrangement
probably spared Iraq defeat in the war.
Now, in the 1990s, the Turks were helping the Iraqis once
again. They were repressing the lawlessness of the Kurds, and
preventing the north from achieving de facto independence. The
raids did this by drawing attention to the unstable conditions
there, and underscoring the fact that the Kurdish leadership
could not control the area.
In any event, the cross-border raids are chiefly of interest
for the response they evoked from Iran. Iran never repudiated the
PKK as a client-organization, or stopped supporting that group,
but it began to branch out, as it were. Rafsanjani, Iran's
president, summoned the leaders of the two opposing Iraqi Kurdish

10

factions to Tehran. There, he announced that Iran would mediate
the leaders' dispute.41 Nothing of substance came out of the
conference, but it was shortly after this that Talabani began to
behave as a client of Tehran.42 At the same time, Barzani moved
over into the camp of the Turks.43 Thus, it seems likely that by
early 1995 America and Britain had lost control of their Iraqi
Kurdish clients, and things then began to move at a fast pace
toward the crisis of this past September.
The Crisis Erupts.
The incident which touched off the crisis occurred on July
29, 1996, when Iranian Revolutionary Guards crossed into Iraqi
Kurdistan, ostensibly hunting Iranian Kurdish guerrillas, who
(the Iranians claimed) use the area as a base against Iran.44 This
almost certainly was a deception. The Revolutionary Guards went
into northern Iraq to assist Talabani in his fight against
Barzani. They penetrated 50 kilometers into the interior and left
arms for Talabani as they departed. Why at this moment did the
Iranians decide to make such a potentially disruptive move?
My feeling is that they were upset by the U.N. decision to
allow Iraq to sell oil, for they saw in this concession the
beginning of the end of the economic embargo against Iraq.45 By
bringing aid to Talabani, the Iranians were positioning
themselves to strike at the oil pipeline through which Iraqi oil
was to move to the world markets. (See Figure 1.)
The Talabani guerrillas equipped with Iranian-supplied
weapons--and more than likely directed by Revolutionary Guards
left behind in Iraq--would interdict the flow of oil through the
pipeline, frustrating Iraq's hopes of getting out from under the
embargo to begin its recovery.
A number of points can be made about this raid. First, the
U.S. reaction was remarkably restrained.46 It is likely the U.S.
policymakers did not appreciate the seriousness of what Iran had
done. Indeed, it is probably the case that the Americans equated
the Iranian raid with the other earlier raids by the Turks, which
never seemed to come to anything--at least the Iraqi government
never felt provoked to retaliate.
The difference, however--as pointed out above--was that
Turkey conducted its raids almost certainly with Iraqi
acquiescence, and the raiding constituted, therefore, a form of
aid to Iraq, keeping the northern area under control, which the
Iraqi government was prevented from doing because of U.S.-imposed
restraints.
Another point is the effect of the raid on Turkey. Turkey
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was eager to see the oil deal which Iraq had brokered with the
United Nations consummated, as Turkey stood to benefit
financially from it. It would gain revenue from transit fees-since the oil moved to market through a pipeline which crossed
Turkish territory--and, in addition, Turkey had worked out
separate deals with Baghdad to sell it food and other
necessities.47
Turkey would not have been misled by Iranian protestations
that they were only going after anti-Tehran guerrillas. It would
have subjected the operation to keen scrutiny, and Turkey would
have seen that this was a threat to its interests.
Iraq would also have seen the operation for what it was--a
potentially lethal strike at its sovereignty, which-- unless
countered--could signal the breakup of the state.48
Finally, Barzani would have seen that his position was
undercut by his rival Talabani receiving arms and technical
assistance from Tehran.
It is my belief that this move of Iran into northern Iraq
was a blunder. The rapidity with which the anti-Tehran coalition
(Turkey, Barzani, and Iraq) responded indicates prior planning.
These three must have contemplated some such move on Iran's part
and been set to counter it.
One mystery is who initiated the prior planning: Turkey,
Iraq, or Barzani? Barzani is a likely candidate, since he had a
grudge against the West, in general, and the United States, in
particular. This dates back to the mid-1970s, when then-Secretary
of State Kissinger betrayed Barzani's father, Mulla Mustafa
Barzani--at least this is how Masoud Barzani views the matter.
Kissinger abruptly withdrew U.S. support for Mulla Mustafa's
anti-Baghdad revolt, prompting the Kurdish chief to flee to Iran
with the remnants of his movement.49
Mosoud Barzani also has the reputation of being a
strategist, someone who plots every move and then does what is
best for his interests. He does not act--as many Kurdish chiefs
are reputed to do--on impulse. Thus, once he had determined that
the Iranian move was harmful to him, he would have been receptive
to any means of countering it.
At the same time, however, Barzani would not have had the
temerity to devise anything so portentous as seizing Irbil. By
doing that, he and Saddam defied Washington in the most blatant
manner. There are penalties for such actions, which the Kurdish
leader would not have been anxious to incur. It seems likely
therefore that Barzani merely agreed to go along with the
seizure, but someone else conceived the idea. Saddam is capable
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of such bold action. The Iraqi leader has a keen sense of Iraq's
national interest and, were he to perceive that Iraqi integrity
were threatened, would not hesitate to strike.
But, then, the Turks, too, are sensitive to such concerns,
particularly the Turkish general staff. The Turkish generals
consider themselves the guardians of the legacy of the founder of
modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.50 Ataturk decreed that Turkey must
consider itself a satisfied status quo power. This meant that
Ankara would uphold the state system in the region, renouncing
all claims on its neighbors' territory, but, at the same time,
expecting them to respect the balance of power.
Iran, by moving into northern Iraq, was maneuvering to
drastically shift the balance in its favor, and therefore it is
understandable that the generals would want to act. To be sure,
an operation such as this--one which harmed the United States-could easily have backfired on Turkey. I do not believe this
would have stopped the generals.
The Turkish government has to worry about the reaction
Turkey's policies will have on Washington, but this not the case
with the generals. Moreover, the generals could claim--with some
justification--that the government's attempts to appease
Washington have not born fruit. Turkey has seen the U.S. Congress
slash its aid--it is all in the form of grants now, and the sum
is relatively insubstantial.51 Further, the Turks have been
outraged by what they perceive as the U.S. Congress' pandering to
the Greek and Armenian lobbies. And finally, Washington promised
to back Turkey's bid to enter the European Union, and so far that
has not materialized.
I am not suggesting that the generals acted on their own,
ignoring the civilian leadership. It is rather that the generals
would have--in my estimate--taken the lead on this. Recognizing
that Iran's penetration threatened the power balance, they would
have endorsed a counter-stroke, and I don't believe that worries
over how this would be received in Washington would have stopped
them.
Now that the Iraqis and Barzanis have recaptured Irbil,
Washington's position in the area is almost completely undercut.
Whereas in the past the United States controlled events, now it
is practically relegated to the sidelines. This was evident in
the most recent flare-up, where the Talabani forces--after having
been driven completely out of Iraq--returned, with Iran's aid, to
reconquer territory they had lost. For a time, it appeared that
Iraq would come to Barzani's aid again, provoking a possible
clash with the Iranians. American diplomats had to struggle
mightily to restrain Talabani from making a drive on Irbil, and
ultimately make him agree to a ceasefire. As of this writing,
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whether the fighting actually would cease was up in the air.
This counter-stroke by the Talabani faction is particularly
worrisome, since it represents a significant escalation. All of
the parties--Iraq, the Kurdish factions, Turkey and Iran--must
now gauge how far they want to go with this. More than ever there
is the possibility of a runaway war.
Summing up, as a result of this affair, Turkey, Iraq and
Barzani have all been drawn into a coalition.52 Opposing them are
Iran, Syria and Talabani. Most unfortunate, for the interests of
the West, the influence of the United States and Britain has been
seriously weakened. We are too close to events to predict how the
affair will develop, but the situation seems certain to
deteriorate further.
The U.S. Position.
American policy on Iraq has gone through three shifts of
emphasis. First, the United States was in the Gulf to ensure the
flow of oil to the world market, and no one--or few, at any rate-objected to that. Then, it was there to guard the safehaven for
the Kurds, and support for this mission was thin at best. Most
recently, U.S. policy seems to have been directed towards
toppling Saddam Hussein, and--with the exception of Britain,
Israel and Kuwait--no one has supported this approach; even some
of the Gulf Cooperation Council states have opposed it.53
Setting aside the issue of how this anti-Saddam shift came
to be, a number of related issues should be taken into
consideration.
First, I do not believe that Iraq could survive the
disappearance of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'thists; it is far more
likely that the country would fall apart. To those who believe
the present regime could be dispensed with, I would propose the
following analogy--it is like saying that we will keep the flesh,
but abstract the skeleton out of the living form; the Ba'th is
the skeleton that holds Iraq upright.54
The reasons why the Iraqi people tolerate the Ba'th are many
and complex. However, I would like to cite one probable cause-prior to the coming of the Ba'th, conditions in Iraq were almost
anarchical. Regimes succeeded each other in a revolving door
pattern, and each change of government was accompanied by
dreadful purges. Having lived through the pre-Ba'thist days, the
Iraqi people are not willing to see a government change, unless
they know what new form of rule--or disrule--is to be visited on
them.55
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Moreover, if there is not some strong regime in power in
Baghdad, the country will become a prey to its neighbors-- two of
which have irredentist claims upon it.56 To prevent Iraq's
neighbors from exercising their claims, the United States would
have to permanently occupy the country; otherwise there would be
no defense against foreign takeovers.
We should not forget that, after Saudi Arabia, Iraq has the
largest reserves of oil in the world, and that one of its richest
fields is located on the edge of the Iraqi Kurdish region, in
Kirkuk. This is precisely the area Iran was attempting to
penetrate with its latest raid.
Without belaboring the point, it is important to keep in
mind that the main justification for the U.S. military presence
in the Gulf is to keep the oil flowing, and, to do that,
Washington must promote stability. Present policy has not been
conducive to this. In particular, efforts to overthrow the regime
in Iraq have worked against it. It could be argued that America's
present policy is undermining the very purpose for which it was
set up.
Most of America's allies seem to have drawn this conclusion,
and this is why they have been so chary about supporting
Washington in the latest crisis. It is not that the allies favor
the Ba'th, much less Saddam Hussein; rather they will not support
a change of government in Iraq, unless there is an equally
strong, well-organized, and disciplined regime available to take
over. Washington's present candidate to rule Iraq after the Ba'th
is the Iraqi National Congress. Few in the Middle East take this
organization seriously.57
The most disconcerting aspect of the recent crisis in Iraqi
Kurdistan was the behavior of America's allies. Washington found
it could not manage strains in the coalition. Suddenly, the
coalition partners resisted Washington-directed moves against
Baghdad. Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and even Saudi Arabia all fought
shy of this. And, when Washington asked the Security Council to
condemn Iraq, Russia threatened a veto, if it were brought to a
vote. That so much opposition arose is an indication of how
strongly U.S. allies regard this issue.
Now, the United States proposes to shift its emphasis on
Iraq once again--to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH from Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT. It wants to use American air power to, in
effect, deny Iraq control over almost half the country. There is
much to recommend against this new policy.
Public Goods.
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The original no-fly zones set up over northern and southern
Iraq were never mandated by the United Nations. Rather this
security regime was something imposed on the Iraqis by the
victorious allies after the Gulf War.58
At the time the zones were established, many felt the allies
were taking matters too much into their own hands. Indeed,
Washington never consulted the members of the Security Council
before it took the step. Once the United States had the support
of Britain and France, it simply went ahead.
This means that for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH to continue
(and, indeed, to be expanded), there has to be a strong weight of
moral authority on the side of Washington. There is no such
consensus at the present time, and therefore Operation SOUTHERN
WATCH is virtually a two-man show (Britain and the United
States).59
There is a further problem with Operation SOUTHERN WATCH: it
is likely to result in an additional buildup of forces in the
southern Gulf. Pious Muslims reject the American presence that is
already there. They certainly will react adversely to the
introduction of more troops, and their anger is liable to be
translated into attacks on U.S. installations.60 Ultimately, this
could undermine the House of Saud.
However, the greatest danger is open defiance of the United
States, which could come about at any time. The possibility is
increasing that one of the major powers-- France, Russia, or
China--will turn against Washington, deciding unilaterally to
break the economic embargo. This would constitute a stunning
challenge to the U.S. world leadership role.
Effectively, then, the United States must have a new policy
on Iraq, and the only way to proceed on this is to recognize that
the Gulf constitutes a public good; that is to say, it is in the
interests of all the world's nations to guard the oil coming out
of the Gulf, and--recognizing this fact--it would be wise to
coordinate efforts for bringing this about.
Put another way, the Gulf is an asset in which all the
world's nations can claim a stake, and therefore whatever is done
about it must be of benefit to all involved. Washington cannot
unilaterally decide what is correct. In particular, it cannot
take up immutable positions, such as that Saddam Hussein must go.
Not all of our allies agree with the United States on this, and
the more the United States insists on the rightness of its stand,
the more coalition disharmony results.
And finally, the United States must confront the reality
that the present strategy of trying to control Iraq by using air
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power and missiles alone is not working. If the United States
proceeds much farther on its present course, we will soon have to
confront the need for ground forces. These cannot be employed
without first having a great national debate, and that is
something for which, it does not appear, the nation is ready.
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8. France had at the time a Socialist government under
Francoise Mitterand, and Mitterand's wife is one of the foremost
supporters of the Kurdish cause in Europe.
9. For the smuggling activities of the Kurds, see Brian
Sullivan, "International Organized Crime: A Growing National
Security Threat," Strategic Forum, No. 74, May 1996; "Turks' War
With the Kurds Reaches a New Ferocity," The New York Times,
October 18, 1993; David McDowell, "The Struggle for Kurdistan,"
Middle East International, April 28, 1995; "Turks find way round
sanctions on Baghdad," The Financial Times, December 8, 1994;
"Balkan War Victor: Heroin," The Washington Post, November 6,
1993; "Boom and Embargo: Iraqi Smugglers Prosper Despite Tough
U.N. Sanctions," The Washington Post, May 16, 1995; and "Heroin
Pouring Through Porous European Border, The New York Times,
February 9, 1993.
10. There are between 10 and 12 million Turkish Kurds, and
about 2 1/2 to 3 million Iraqi Kurds, and then there are Kurdish
communities in Iran and Syria as well.
11. See "Among the Arabs Little Enthusiasm," The New York
Times, August 17, 1992; "Arabs Are Uneasy On Plan For Iraq," The
New York Times, August 20, 1992; "Bush Faces Tricky Decisions in
Trying to Get Tougher With Saddam Hussein," The Wall Street
Journal, August 3, 1992; "Contrast in U.S. Policies Is Straining
Alliance," The Washington Post, September 19, 1992; "Moroccan
Warns U.S. About Iraq," The Washington Post, September 6, 1992;
"Behind the No-Fly-Zone Strategy; Dwindling Coalition Against

18

Iraq," The Christian Science Monitor, September 1, 1992; "U.S.
Has Trouble Maintaining Unity of Allies on Iraq," The New York
Times, July 28, 1991; "America's Allies in Gulf War Shy about
Bombing Iraq's Nuclear Facilities," The Christian Science
Monitor, July 31, 1991; and "Jordan Rejects U.S. Request," The
Washington Post, June 29, 1992. The Arabs regarded the Kurds as
tools of the Iranians and Israelis. Many Arabs have never
forgotten that the Kurds cooperated with attempts by the Shah of
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Press, 1990.
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32. Ibid.
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However, Turkey's then President Turgut Ozal was able to force it
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the next election. He died soon after this.
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unilaterally. Hence, early this year, Washington agreed to let
Baghdad sell a specified amount of oil every two months and use
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war claims against the Iraqi state.
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Iraq's sovereignty.
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Financial Times, August 16, 1996.
48. In fact, it does seem that that was what was on the
point of happening. Just after Tehran launched the raid, Turkey
announced that it was going to set up a security zone in northern
Iraq, to make sure that PKK militants could not cross over into
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letting the Iranians know that they must not think that they
could take over in the north, that Turkey was prepared to contest
them should they go ahead with any such plan.
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the level of neighborhoods and villages. All of the military
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56. At the end of World War I, British troops seized Mosul
after the armistice was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the
victorious Allies. The Turks have always maintained that this was
improper and have frequently raised the prospect that, were the
area to disintegrate into anarchy, Turkey would repossess the
north of Iraq. Similarly, Iran maintained a virtual sphere of
interest over the predominantly Shia areas of southern Iraq until
the coming of the Ba'th. Moreover, the two holiest shrines of
Shiadom, Najaf and Karbala, are in southern Iraq.
57. See the interview with Barzani in "Die CIA kann Saddam
nicht sturzen," Der Spiegel, 39/1996.
58. The no-fly zones are so-called Chapter 6 actions of the
United Nations. Unlike Chapter 7 actions, they are not
enforceable. The economic embargo is a Chapter 7.
59. France has indicated that it is disinclined to
participate in an expanded overflight of southern Iraq.
60. On the order of the two attacks on bases in Saudi Arabia
which have already been perpetrated.
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